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1 Introduction
Inequality and poverty measurement share a common ancestry. Many economists
and other social scientists are generally aware of this but, if pressed, are not
too sure about what the exact dynastic connections are. The aim of this
chapter is to explain a little of the “who is related to whom” and to distin-
guish some of the main family traits.
However, we will be thinking about close family only. We will not be
going into some of the interesting further relations with deprivation, aﬄu-
ence, polarisation concentration and so on; the chapter will not attempt to
provide a comprehensive survey;1 nor will we be going beyond income-related
inequality and poverty (although the definition of “income” can be stretched
a bit). Furthermore the chapter confines itself to the problems of measure-
ment only. So we will not be taking a detour to examine the interesting
recent evidence on inequality and poverty trends in particular countries nor
will we be looking at the many important questions that arise in the practi-
cal implementation of the measures – the statistical issues of estimation and
inference.
As can be seen by scanning the headings below we shall devote rather
more time to inequality than to poverty. There are two good reasons for this:
many of the important abstract concepts were worked out first in the inequal-
ity context and then extended to the formal analysis of poverty; furthermore
1For a broad overview of inequality measurement see Cowell (2000, 2011), Lambert
(2001) and for surveys of poverty measurement see Zheng (1997, 2000).
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many of these abstract concepts are, in my opinion, more appropriate in the
inequality context. We begin with some explanation of terms.
2 A framework
For most of the time we will consider a society consisting of a fixed popula-
tion. So, we assume that there are n persons, each with an identifiable and
observable income. Each person i’s income is represented by a real number xi
that tells us all that we need to know about the individual in the inequality-
measurement or poverty-measurement problem. To be more precise we will
suppose that for any i, xi ∈ X where X is a subset of the real line. The
exact assumption that we make about X is a reflection of our assumption
about the nature of “income”: for example, it is common to assume that
X consists only of non-negative numbers (appropriate if “income” actually
means consumption expenditure; but for some inequality problems (such as
the inequality of net worth) negative values make perfectly good sense.
The number xi may or may not completely represent person i’s well-
being. Whether or not it does so depends on the use to which we want to
put the measurement tools. Although a comprehensive definition of income
would be required for welfare-based interpretations of inequality (see section
4) much of the formal analysis applies equally to broadly based and narrowly
based definitions of income. The principal requirement is that the equalisand,
4
“income”, however it is defined, be representable on a cardinal scale.2
2.1 Income distributions
In our framework an “income distribution” is simply an n-vector of peo-
ple’s incomes x := (x1, x2, · · · , xn). It is useful to express mean income in
shorthand form as
µ (x) = µ (x1, x2, · · · , xn) = 1
n
n∑
i=1
xi. (1)
In analysing inequality it is sometimes useful to merge populations and then
to analyse the income distribution in the merged society. To handle this we
use the following notation: if x and x′ are vectors with n and n′ compo-
nents respectively, then (x,x′) is an (n+ n′)-vector formed by stringing the
components of x and x′ together. Given a precise specification of “income”,
incorporated in the assumption about X the set of all possible income dis-
tributions is given by Xn; but sometimes we want to refer only to the subset
of this consisting of distributions with a specified mean µ: we will write this
as Xn(µ). We will use 1 to denote the vector (1, 1, ..., 1): so, for example, µ1
is a perfectly equal distribution with mean µ.
Clearly we could talk about inequality within a very simple economy
consisting of just two persons. But this would not be very interesting. In
Figure 1 the horizontal axis measures Irene’s income and the vertical axis
2Inequality measurement when the equalisand is purely ordinal rather than cardinal
presents a different class of problems – see Cowell and Flachaire (2014).
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Janet’s income; the 45◦ ray through the origin represents distributions that
are perfectly equal, the point marked x shows the supposed current income
distribution (with Irene richer than Janet) and the solid line through x (at
right-angles to the equality ray) represents all the distributions that could
be reached from x by simple income transfers. So the point µ1 – where
µ = µ(x) is mean income – represents the distribution that would emerge if
incomes were to be equalised between Irene and Janet. If Irene and Janet’s
incomes were swapped to give the income distribution x′ presumably inequal-
ity would remain unchanged; if the income distribution x were to be moved
closer to µ1 then presumably inequality would be reduced. But we do not
need a formal inequality measure to tell us this, nor do we need a formal
statement of distributional principles in order to make sensible comparisons
of distribution.
By contrast Figure 2 shows that distributional comparisons could be much
more interesting in a 3-person world. The axes measure the incomes of Irene,
Janet and Karen; as before x shows the supposed current income distribution
(with Irene richer than Janet who is richer than Karen); the triangular shaped
area (formally known as a simplex) is X3(µ), representing all the possible
distributions with the same mean as x; and, again as before, the point µ1 in
this triangle represents the distribution that would emerge if incomes were to
be equalised among all three persons (the ray through 0 and µ1 represents
all such perfectly equal distributions. Straightaway we can see that this
three-person case represents us with a much richer set of alternatives for
6
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Figure 1: Income distributions n = 2
comparison in terms of inequality. For example: whereas there was one other
income distribution achievable by switching identities in the two-person case,
now there are up to five such distributions: should all be regarded as equally
unequal? Presumably a change in the distribution from x to a point on the
line joining x and µ1 would reduce inequality, but what about some other
move within the simplex away from x and in the general direction of µ1 –
would that reduce inequality? To answer these questions precisely we need
to introduce some formal analysis. We do this in section 3.
2.2 The axiomatic approach
The formality that we will apply to the inequality-measurement problem and
later to its counterpart in poverty analysis can be described as the axiomatic
7
Figure 2: Income distributions n = 3
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method, which can be briefly explained as follows:
• set out and defend on a priori grounds a minimal set of principles or
axioms to which inequality comparisons or poverty comparisons ought
to conform;
• follow mathematical logic to characterise the class of measures that
exactly satisfy these principles;
• if necessary add further axioms to narrow down the class of measures.
Clearly the method is only as good as the reasonableness of the individual
axioms that we choose to introduce. “Reasonable” here could mean that the
axiom accords with economic intuition, or that it accords with people’s views
on distributional comparisons, or that it simplifies an otherwise intractable
mathematical problem, or that it is helpful in empirical implementation.
2.3 Measurement tools
There is a variety of types of measurement tool that might be considered for
the analysis of inequality and poverty. We will focus on three types:
1 A distributional ordering. Here we want to be able to say something like
this: “When we compare distributions x and x′ either (i) inequality in
x is higher than in x′, or (ii) inequality in x′ is higher than in x, or (iii)
inequality in x and x′ is the same.” To do this it is sufficient to have an
inequality index that is defined up to a monotonic transformation. The
9
same thing applies also to distributional orderings in terms of poverty
– just substitute the word “poverty” for “inequality” in the foregoing.
2 A distributional ranking.3 This is similar to type 1 but we allow for one
further possibility in addition to (i)-(iii) above: “(iv) x and x′ cannot
be unambiguously compared in terms of inequality (or poverty).”
3 A cardinal index. Inequality or poverty can be represented by a cardinal
index that is defined up to a change of scale. Comparing this with type
1 we can see that it is similar but, whereas in type 1 the index could be
subjected to any order-preserving transformation and still be regarded
as operationally the same index, here we allow only scale changes.4
3 Inequality measurement: principles
Let us begin with a standard measurement tool, an inequality measure: this
is a function I that assigns a numerical value to any distribution in Xn. We
would write the inequality of income distribution x as
I (x) = I (x1, x2, · · · , xn) . (2)
3Sometimes also known as a quasi-ordering (Weymark 2015).
4Example. It is arguable that the variance – equation (6) below – could be used as a
satisfactory inequality measure; if so then the standard deviation would do just as well if we
are merely concerned with a distributional ordering; but if we want a cardinal index then
the standard deviation will give different results from the variance. Note also that, strictly
speaking we should allow for scale and origin changes for a cardinal index. However, if
we assume that the minimum value of the inequality or poverty index is set at zero this
automatically fixes the origin.
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For the moment we are only concerned with making simple inequality com-
parisons of any two members of Xn, so a particular function I could be
replaced by any increasing transform (for example log (I) ,I2,exp (I) , ...) and
leave the comparisons unchanged; we are talking about a “type 1” measure-
ment tool in the language of section 2.3.
3.1 Inequality measures and their properties
Following the outline in section 2.2 our first step is to set out a set of axioms
(assumptions) each of which can be defended on its own merits. In fact
a small group of core assumptions – Axioms 1-4 below – is sufficient to
characterise completely a widely used class of inequality measures. Some of
these core axioms are also relevant to poverty measurement. We will discuss
their reasonableness as we go along.
Axiom 1 (Anonymity). Suppose x′ is formed from x by a permutation of
the components; then I (x) = I (x′).
Axiom 2 (Population Principle). I (x) = I (x,x, ...,x).
Axiom 3 (Transfer Principle). Suppose x′ is formed from x thus: x′i =
xi + δ, x′j = xj − δ, x′k = xk for all k 6= i, j where δ > 0 is such that
x′i, x
′
j ∈ X . If xi ≥ xj then I (x) < I (x′) .
Axioms 1 and 2 are easily expressed in plain language: for any income
distribution, relabelling the persons in the distribution or simply replicating
11
the distribution leaves inequality unaffected. However, we should not let
these two apparently innocuous assumptions pass without some comment.
The anonymity principle seems fine as long as we really believe that income
captures all that is important about a person’s current economic status (we
have sorted out any difficulties concerning differences in needs, for example)
and that history is unimportant (if it were known that Irene had had been
heavily disadvantaged and Janet excessively privileged in the past then some
might not think that swapping the current incomes xi and xj is neutral in
terms of inequality). Axiom 3 says that a mean-preserving redistribution
from anyone to someone who is richer must increase inequality – and vice
versa, of course (Dalton 1920). Figure 3 shows a closeup (taken from Figure
2) of the income distribution x and the other distributions attainable from
x through simple transfers.
To find your way around this triangle notice first that the point in the
centre represents complete equality, where everyone receives the mean µ. The
corner labelled [Irene] represents complete inequality, where Irene receives
all the income; any point on the side of the triangle opposite this corner
represents a distribution where Irene gets nothing and total income is divided
between Janet and Karen alone. So starting from any such point on this line
and heading directly towards the [Irene] corner we find distributions where
Irene gets more and more income (and the ratio between Janet’s income and
12
Karen’s stays constant).5 So point x, being closest to the [Irene] corner, must
represent a distribution where Irene gets the most income; and, because x is
closer to the [Janet] corner than to [Karen], Janet must get more than Karen
in this distribution.
Let us label the point representing distribution x as (i): then simply
swapping incomes between pairs of people yields points (ii)-(vi) and Axiom
1 means that all the points (i),...,(vi) are equally unequal. Axiom 3 (the
Transfer Principle) implies that inequality must be lower anywhere in the
interior of the line connecting adjacent pairs of these points (this would
involve a partial equalisation between two of the people, leaving the third
person’s income unchanged); from further reasoning on the Transfer Principle
we can see that the inequality associated with any point in the interior of
the hexagon associated with x is less than I (x) (Champernowne and Cowell
1998, Chapter 5).
This interpretation immediately reveals an apparent difficulty, illustrated
in Figure 4. Suppose we try to compare distributions x and x′ in terms of
inequality: it is clear that distribution x′ does not lie inside the x-hexagon
(copied from Figure 3); nor does x does not lie inside the x′-hexagon. The
Transfer Principle is insufficient to produce a clear inequality ranking of all
the points in Xn(µ). There are two ways forward from here:
5Of course the same interpretation applies to the [Janet] or [Karen] corner and the line
opposite.
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Figure 3: Income distributions n = 3 (close-up)
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Figure 4: Distributions x and x′ cannot be ranked by the Transfer Principle
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Figure 5: Two contour maps
1. One could force a resolution of the ambiguity by a contour map on the
diagram. Two possible systems of contours are illustrated in Figure
5, each of which satisfies Axioms 1-3: contours further away from the
centre correspond to higher inequality levels. Ideally such a contour
map should be supported by further axioms with a clear rationale in
terms of economic intuition.
2. One could live with the ambiguity and obtain a richer insight into
inequality comparisons. We give up on finding a type-1 inequality
measurement tool and consider type-2 comparisons – this is pursued in
section 6.
Let us follow up the first of these routes now by introducing two further
apparently reasonable axioms.
15
Axiom 4 (Decomposability). Let x,x′ ∈ Xn(µ) and x′′ ∈ Xn′(µ). If I (x) ≥
I (x′) then I (x,x′′) ≥ I (x′,x′′).
Axiom 5 (Scale Invariance). Let x,x′ ∈ Xn(µ) and λ > 0. If I (x) ≥ I (x′)
then I (λx) ≥ I (λx′).
Decomposability (Axiom 4) means this: take two distributions x and x′
with the same population size n and the same mean µ; merge each of them
with any third distribution x′′ that has the same mean µ (but not necessarily
the same population size); then, if x is more unequal than x′, x-merged-with-
x′′ is also more unequal than x′-merged-with-x′′.
Scale Invariance (Axiom 5), also known as “homotheticity”, is a property
that applies to the shape of the contour maps at different levels of income. If
x and x′ register the same amount of inequality in Xn(µ) then the “scaled-
up” or “scaled-down” versions of these distributions, where each person’s
income is rescaled by the same factor λ, are also regarded as equally unequal
in Xn(λµ). The property is illustrated in Figure 6 where the contours at
the higher income level can be regarded as a “blow-up” of the inequality
contours at the lower income level. Notice that Axiom 5 does not say that
inequality remains constant under a scale change of all incomes; of course
it may make sense to replace this axiom with the stronger requirement of
scale independence, namely that I (λx) = I (x); but this is not necessary for
the basic results. Also, using scale invariance rather than scale independence
leaves open an interesting possibility, discussed in subsection 3.1.3 below.
16
Figure 6: Scale invariance
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3.1.1 Scale-invariant inequality measures
Equipped with these two extra axioms we have the following result (Bour-
guignon 1979; Cowell 1980; Shorrocks 1980, 1984; Russell 1985; Zagier 1982):
Theorem 1 Axioms 1-5 imply that a continuous inequality index must be
ordinally equivalent6 to
IGE (x) =
1
α [α− 1]
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
xi
µ (x)
]α
− 1
]
, (3)
where α is a sensitivity parameter that can be assigned any real value.7
From Theorem 1 emerges not a single inequality measure but a broad class
or family of measures commonly known as the generalised entropy (GE) mea-
sures (Cowell 1977, Cowell and Kuga 1981a, 1981b; Toyoda 1975) ; the class
forms an important example of so-called relative inequality indices (Blacko-
rby and Donaldson 1978). Any one member of the family in (3), picked out
by a particular value of α will do the job of ordering all the distributions in
Xn(µ); so the important question is, how to pick α? Figure 7 illustrates the
iso-inequality contours for various values of α. In the extreme case α = −∞
6Continuity of the index is a technical requirement which ensures that measured in-
equality does not “jump” by a substantial amount when there is an infinitesimal change
in the income distribution: for an interesting exception to this see note 26 on poverty
indices. Two measures I and I ′ are said to be ordinally equivalent over Xn(µ) if there is
a function f , increasing in its first argument, such that I ′ = f (I;n, µ).
7Using L’Hï¿œpital’s rule one can show that the limiting form for the case α = 0 is
given by I (x) = −∑ni=1 log ( xiµ(x)), the so-called Mean Logarithmic Deviation and the
limiting form for the case α = 1 is given by I (x) = 1n
∑n
i=1
xi
µ(x) log
(
xi
µ(x)
)
− 1, the Theil
index (in fact both indices were developed by Theil 1967).
18
we can see that redistribution between the richest and the next richest leaves
inequality unaltered (each straight line here represents the distributions that
keep the poorest person’s income constant); only redistribution involving the
poorest affects measured inequality. By contrast in the other extreme case
α = +∞ we can see that redistribution between the poorest and the next
poorest leaves inequality unaltered (each straight line here represents the
distributions that keep the richest person’s income constant) – only redistri-
bution involving the richest affects measured inequality; by similar reasoning
we can see that for positive values of α the GE index is more sensitive to
changes at the top of distribution and for negative values of α the GE index
is more sensitive to changes at the bottom of distribution. The cases α = +2
(contours illustrated on the left-hand side of Figure 5) and α = −1 represent
the practical limits on the sensitivity parameter for most empirical work.
However, reasonable alternatives to Axioms 4 and 5 are available. First,
let us consider modifying the statement of Axiom 4, so that there is no
“overlap” between the incomes in x′′ and the incomes in x or x′ – either the
income of the poorest person in x′′ is at least as high as that of the richest
person in x or x′, or the income of the richest person in x′′ is no greater than
that of the poorest person in x or x′. The relative inequality measures in (3)
also work for this case and in addition we find that now a further inequality
index is also available (Ebert 1988b):
IGini (x) :=
1
2n2µ (x)
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
|xi − xj| (4)
19
Figure 7: Generalised entropy contours for different values of α
This is the Gini index and its contours are depicted in Figures 5(b) and 6.
3.1.2 Translation-invariant inequality measures
Now consider a second alternative to the standard axioms. In place of scale
invariance it is sometimes argued that the following structural assumption is
appropriate (Kolm 1976a, 1976b):
Axiom 6 (Translation Invariance). Let x,x′ ∈ Xn(µ). If I (x) ≥ I (x′)
then I (x+δ1) ≥ I (x′+δ1).
Again, notice that this is just a requirement on the pattern of the contours
and it is weaker than requiring translation independence, namely I (x) =
I (x+δ1). If we replace the scale-invariance property used in Theorem 1
20
with translation invariance then we have the following result (Bosmans and
Cowell 2010):
Theorem 2 Axioms 1-4 and 6 imply that a continuous inequality index must
either be ordinally equivalent to
1
n
n∑
i=1
eβ[xi−µ(x)] − 1, (5)
where β 6= 0 is a sensitivity parameter, or to
1
n
n∑
i=1
[xi − µ (x)]2 (6)
(replacing the case β = 0).
Equation (5) gives us a class of absolute measures (Blackorby and Donald-
son 1980b) of inequality; members of this class for which β > 0 are ordinally
equivalent to the Kolm (1976a) class of indices:
IβK (x) := log
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
eβ[xi−µ(x)]
)
. (7)
Equation (6) is just the variance. Again if we use the non-overlapping version
of decomposability we find that there is another index that is both decom-
posable and translation-invariant:
IAG (x) :=
1
2n2
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
|xi − xj| , (8)
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the so-called “absolute Gini” – the connection with the regular Gini in (4)
is obvious. In contrast to scale invariance – where the inequality-contour
map remains invariant under scalar transformations of income – translation
invariance means that the contour map remains invariant under uniform
additions to or subtractions from income.8
3.1.3 Inequality and income levels
If we review the contour maps for the inequality measures in sections 3.1.1
and 3.1.2 we will find exactly two maps that are consistent with both scale-
and translation-invariance: these are the ones illustrated in Figure 5 above –
the variance (6) and for the Gini coefficient (8). For each of these two cases
Figure 8 illustrates how one can connect the contours at different levels of
income either along rays through 0 (scale invariance) or along lines parallel
to the ray through 0 and µ1 (translation invariance). However, we may be
interested in a stronger requirement: scale- or translation-independence. Here
scale independence means that inequality stays the same as all incomes are
increased proportionately – I (x) = I (λx) – and translation independence
means that inequality stays the same as all incomes are increased by the
same absolute amount – I (x) = I (x+δ1). Clearly both cannot be true at
the same time unless one confines attention to trivial cases of perfectly equal
distributions.
8There are also “intermediate” versions of invariance can be specified (Bossert 1988;
Bossert and Pfingsten 1990; Kolm 1969, 1976a, 1976b).
22
Figure 8: Scale or translation independence?
3.2 Decomposition
The decomposability property (Axiom 4) enables us to examine the break-
down of inequality by population subgroups. This property is particularly
useful if we want to get some insight on the apparent “causes” of overall
income inequality. There need to be heavy quotation marks around the word
“causes”: it is interesting to know, for example, whether changes in world
inequality appear to be associated with changes in the income distribution
within individual countries or with changes in the overall income levels in
the various countries; but obviously we would be doing no more than a kind
23
of sophisticated distributional accounting procedure. Nonetheless, this kind
of accounting procedure can be informative if properly carried out.9
3.2.1 Arbitrary partition
To fix ideas, suppose we partition the population into m arbitrary subgroups
that are mutually exclusive and exhaustive; for example if the partition were
by sex we might have m = 2 groups (“male”, “female”) or possibly m = 3
groups if we allow for the value “unknown” alongside “male” and “female”.
The decomposability property means that we can write overall inequality
as a function of inequality in each subgroup ` = 1, ...,m which may also
depend on the population shares of each subgroup, pi` (defined as n`/n ,
where ∑m`=1 n` = n) and the income shares of each subgroup, s` (defined as
µ`n`/µn , where
∑m
`=1 s` = 1). In its most general form we would have:
I (x) = Φ (I (x1) , I (x2) , ..., I (xm) ;pi1, pi2, ..., pim; s1, s2, ..., sm) (9)
where x` means the income distribution in subgroup `. If we also require
that the inequality measure be scale invariant (Axiom 5) then, as we know,
the inequality measure has to take the form (3), or a transform of it. So in
9For an account of the issues involved and the relationship between decomposition by
subgroups and decomposition by factor components see (Cowell and Fiorio 2011).
24
this case we could write10
IGE (x) =
m∑
`=1
w`IGE (x`) + IGE (xBetw) , (10)
where
w` := pi1−α` sα` (11)
and xBetw is the distribution that would emerge if, for every group `, all n`
persons were to receive exactly µ`, the mean of group `, so that
IGE (xBetw) =
1
α [α− 1]
[
m∑
`=1
pi`
[
µ`
µ (x)
]α
− 1
]
. (12)
Equation (10) gives us an additive decomposition formula and is easy to inter-
pret. The first term on the right-hand side represents aggregate within-group
inequality and consists of the weighted sum of inequality in each subgroup
where the weights are given by (11); the second term is the between-group
component of inequality. So, in principle we can make a clear distinction
between the contribution to overall inequality of the inequality in any one
particular group, between the inequality within one group and the weight ac-
corded to that group in the aggregation, and between the aggregate within-
group component and the between-group component (for example, on the
one hand, the inequality among males and among females weighted using
(11) and, on the other hand inequality between males and female)s.
10Clearly we could do a similar exercise for translation-invariant (Axiom 6) indices using
equation (7).
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One might wonder whether (11) yields numbers that represent “weights”
as conventionally understood: after all it is clear that although they will be
non-negative they may not sum to 100 percent. However, the formula for the
weights (11) immediately reveals that there are exactly two cases where the
adding-up property will hold:
• where α = 0, which yields pure population weights (we aggregate using
the relative numbers of men and women); this is the case of the Mean
Logarithmic Deviation index;
• where α = 1, which yields pure income weights (we aggregate using the
relative income levels rich men and women are); this is the case of the
Theil index.
Clearly it is a matter of judgment whether one requires that the weights
sum to 100 percent; it might be considered an extra that is of secondary
importance compared with the flexibility of being able to select from the full
range of values of the sensitivity parameter α.
3.2.2 Restricted partition
There is a further dimension of choice by the user of inequality measures. In
the previous subsection we implicitly assumed that any and every possible
partition of the population might be considered in the decomposition exercise.
However we know from subsection 3.1.1 that if we restrict attention to cases
where there is no “overlap” of incomes then the Gini coefficient (4) is also
26
available as a scale-independent inequality measure alongside (3). What this
means in the present context is that we choose the subgroups ` = 1, ...,m
such that every income in group ` is less than or equal to the minimum
income in group `′ (or every income in group ` is greater than or equal to
the maximum income in group `′) then we could also use the Gini coefficient
in a decomposition like (9). To see how this works, let us first note that it
is always possible to rewrite the Gini formula (4) in a weighted-income form
as follows
IGini (x) =
n∑
i=1
κix(i), (13)
where (i) stands for “ith smallest”; the κi act as the weights and are given
by
κi(x) :=
1
nµ(x)
[
2 i
n
− 1
n
− 1
]
. (14)
Note that the κi take into account each person’s position in the distribution
(i/n). This has a nice interpretation. Assume that Irene is richer than Janet
who is richer than Karen. Suppose Irene’s income increases by $1 and Janet’s
income decreases by $1 – checking (13) and (14) this transfer by itself means
that inequality must have increased by an amount 2
nµ
[i− j] > 0; suppose
also that Karen’s income increases by $1 and Janet’s income decreases by
$1 – this transfer by itself means that inequality must have decreased by an
amount 2
nµ
[k − j]<0; whether the combined is positive or negative depends
on whether the difference in position i− j is larger or smaller than j − k.
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Suppose we break down the population into two subgroups F and M
where no-one in the F group has an income higher than anyone in the M
group. Clearly inequality in the F group could be written
IGini (xF) =
nF∑
i=1
κi(xF) x(i), (15)
where κi(xF) is person i’s positional weight evaluated within the F group
alone:
κi(xF) =
1
nFµ(xF)
[
2 i
nF
− 1
nF
− 1
]
(16)
From (14) and (16) we have
κi(x) = piFsFκi(xF) +
piF − 1
nµ(x) (17)
and we also find:
IGini (x) = piFsFIGini (xF) + piMsMIGini (xM) + IGini (xBetw) (18)
which gives an exact formula for decomposing the Gini coefficient into non-
overlapping subgroups F and M.
The importance of non-overlapping incomes in the decomposition can
be easily seen if we think about the joint Janet→Irene and Janet→Karen
transfer mentioned above. The effects of these two transfers on inequality
within the F group are just piFsF times the effects of these two transfers on
inequality in the whole population: again they just depend on the relative
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size of i− j and j − k. So, if inequality goes up in the F group, then it also
goes up in the population as a whole, an example of the property known
as subgroup consistency. Now suppose instead that two people from the M
group, Gordon and Harry let us say, have incomes that overlap with those in
the F group; specifically Gordon and Harry are richer than Janet but poorer
than Irene. Clearly the effect of the joint Janet→Irene and Janet→Karen
transfer on inequality within the F group is just what it was in the earlier
example; but the effect in the population as a whole now depends on the
relative size of i − j + 2 and j − k (remember the two guys between Irene
and Janet). So it would be possible to find that inequality goes down in the
F group and up in the distribution as a whole even though inequality in the
M group, inequality between the groups and the weights on the groups stay
the same!
3.3 Alternative approach: reference points
The driving assumption for characterising inequality in the majority of the
theoretical literature is some form of the transfer principle (see Axiom 3). But
in its classic form (Dalton 1920) it is often rejected by people when invited
to compare income distributions (Amiel and Cowell 1992, 1999) and, while
elegant, it is obviously restrictive. An alternative approach to inequality is to
think of it as an aggregation of distance from a relevant reference point. The
reference point could, for example, be an income that is associated with a
particular group. This is the essence of the Temkin approach of characterising
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inequality in terms of complaints about income distribution (Temkin 1986,
Temkin 1993, Devooght 2003, Cowell and Ebert 2004): these “complaints”
are effectively the distances just mentioned and are typically upward-looking
comparisons.
This alternative approach to the assessment of income distribution is in-
dividualistic – as with the standard approach in section 3.1 – but is based on
a concept of differences rather than on income levels. To make this opera-
tional we first need to specify r (x), a reference income that usually depends
on the incomes in the current distribution x: we will discuss below three
different specifications for r (x) that lead to interesting forms for inequality
measures. The second thing to specify is a set of axioms to characterise the
implicit notion of distance from the reference point (the “complaint”) and
the function which aggregates the individual distances
Cowell and Ebert (2004) showed that, under standard assumptions, dis-
tance must be of the form
di =
∣∣∣r (x)− x(i)∣∣∣ , (19)
with the reference-point based inequality index given by
ITemk (x) =
 ∑
di>0
wid
θ
i
 1θ , (20)
where the wi are positive numbers (weights) and θ is a sensitivity param-
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eter.11 Both the sensitivity parameter θ and the weights may incorpo-
rate distributional values. Consider an income transfer from poorer Janet
to richer Irene that leaves the reference point unchanged. This increases
Janet’s distance and decreases Irene’s distance from the unchanged reference
point. From (20) it is clear that the effect of this transfer is proportional to
wjd
θ−1
j −widθ−1i ; So if Irene is richer than Janet and if the reference point is
left unchanged, this transfer will increase inequality if wj ≥ wi and θ > 1 (or
wj > wi and θ = 1).
Three versions of the reference point, highlighted by Temkin’s seminal
work, are of particular interest.
(1) The Best-off Person (BoP)
Here everyone but the richest person has a complaint about inequality. The
reference point for everyone is:
r (x) = x(n).
Of the three types of reference point suggested by Temkin (1986) this is,
perhaps, the most intriguing. For a start in this case there is a second type
of “transfer principle” the effect of transferring income to the richest person
(everyone’s reference point) from any of the other n− 1 persons. As we have
noted, the regular transfer principle (Axiom 3 whereby inequality increases
for any poorer to richer transfer) holds for only for a specific range of pa-
11In the case where θ = 0 (20) is replaced by exp
(∑
di>0 wi log (di)
)
.
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rameter values in (20); but for all θ, the inequality measure (20) satisfies
the principle of transfers-to-the-richest. So there could be some tension be-
tween the two types of transfer principle: if θ ≤ 0 absolute priority is placed
on the salience of the best-off person: so if Irene is the richest and Janet is
richer than Karen then Karen→Janet transfers may reduce inequality (such a
transfer reduces the distance between Janet and Irene) but if an Irene→Janet
transfer always reduces inequality (distance is reduced everywhere).
Let us look at the counterparts to Figures 5 and 7 in the case of reference-
point inequality. Some typical contours of ITemk are depicted in Figure 9 for
cases where the regular transfer principle is satisfied and in Figure 10 for the
case where the regular transfer principle is not satisfied. Notice that if the
weights are equal each contour breaks down into three segments; if we have
differential weights when aggregating the distance in (20) then we have six
segments in each contour (as in the case of IGini). In Figure 10 where the
segments bend the “wrong” way we can see that equalising Janet→Karen
transfers increase inequality.
(2) All Those Better Off
As with BoP, everyone but the best off has a “complaint” about income
distribution. However in this case people at different positions in the income
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Figure 9: BoP-reference inequality (Axiom 3 is satisfied)
Figure 10: BoP-reference inequality (Axiom 3 is not satisfied)
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distribution have different reference points:
ri (x) =
1
n− i
∑
xk>x(i)
xk .
If we replace r (x) by ri (x) in (19) then the resulting inequality measure in
(20) is essentially the same as the deprivation index suggested by Chakravarty
and Mukherjee (1999).12
(3) Average income
If the reference point is just mean income
r (x) = µ(x),
then substituting in (19) yields a class of inequality measures (20) that is
closely related to the family of “compromise” inequality measures in Ebert
(1988a).
4 Inequality: welfare and values
Inequality measurement is not, or should not be, just about formal proposi-
tions in mathematical language. Inequality is something about which some
individuals feel passionately and which is, arguably, a proper concern of pub-
lic policy. So, it is important to examine the ways in which ethical principles
12Of course the general idea of a connection between inequality and deprivation had
been developed much earlier – see Yitzhaki (1979).
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may be incorporated in the analysis of inequality measurement.
4.1 Social welfare and inequality
For a discussion of the role of social values or ethical principles we need an
additional basic tool, the social-welfare function, written as
W (x) = W (x1, x2, · · · , xn) , (21)
which gives a numerical score for every income distribution x in Xn; in this
context each xi is assumed to completely represent person i’s well-being.13
The question immediately arises – what values or principles should be em-
bodied in W? If social values broadly consider that income increases are on
the whole a good thing and inequality increases are a bad thing we would
want this to be built into the structure of W . Clearly it is necessary to con-
nect the formula for social welfare (21) to the formulas for mean income (1)
and inequality measure (2).
A simple representation representation of this connection is as the reduced-
form social-welfare function:
W (x) = Ω (µ (x) , I (x)) (22)
13To achieve this in a heterogeneous society it may be necessary to adjust incomes by
a factor the appropriately reflects, say, the needs of individuals living in different types of
household (Fleurbaey 2015). For more on the nature of individual well-being in connection
with social welfare functions see Weymark (2015).
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where the function Ω is increasing in its first argument (mean income) and
decreasing in its second argument (inequality). A simple example of this is
the social-welfare function given by
µ(x) [1− IGini (x)] ; (23)
from (13) it is clear that this is just the weighted sum of the ordered incomes
x(i) where, in view of (14), the weights must be strictly decreasing as i goes
from 1 to n.
Clearly the properties of the functionW and the function I are intimately
connected: for any given value of µ they will have the same contours in
Xn (but of course the contours will be numbered in opposite directions –
inequality increases imply welfare decreases. However, the relationship with
income levels needs further comment. It is common to assume that W is
strictly increasing in each income xi (the so-called monotonicity property) –
this would mean that, if the status quo is distribution x then social welfare
would be increasing in the direction of any of the arrows in Figure 11 (a).
But it could be argued that this is unacceptably strong; as an alternative
we might suggest either the weaker requirement that welfare should increase
if all incomes were to be increased simultaneously by the same proportional
amount (if λ > 1 we would have W (λx) > W (x) so that welfare increases
along the steeper of the arrows in Figure 11 b) or the requirement that
welfare should increase if all incomes were to be increased simultaneously by
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the same absolute amount (if δ > 0 we would have W (x+δ1) > W (x) so
that welfare increases along the flatter of the arrows in Figure 11 b)14
Figure 11: Social welfare and income growth
If we now rethink the contour maps in Figures 5 to 8 as contours of the
SWF for given mean income, it is clear that one could read this as though
the function W in (21) and (22) “inherits” the properties of the inequality
measure I in (2). But it may be more appropriate to read this in the reverse
direction: inequality is something that is considered socially undesirable or
14Known as the “principle of uniform income growth” (Champernowne and Cowell 1998)
or the “incremental improvement condition” (Chakravarty 1990).
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even wrong; this principle is built into the specification of the SWF; this
specification determines the contours of the SWF and therefore the inequality
contours that appear in the diagrams of section 3. But what values? They
can be essentially characterised as two types of tradeoff:
1. Tradeoffs between equality and efficiency. Inequality represents a loss
of welfare – as one moves within the simplex away from the centre one
moves to lower welfare contours. How much should one give weight to a
movement towards the centre of the simplex µ1, relative to movement
from one µ-simplex to a “higher” one?
2. Tradeoffs between income differences in one part of the distribution
relative to those in another: if Irene is richer than Janet who is richer
than Karen should we prioritise the Irene-Janet income differences or
the Janet-Karen differences?
4.2 Welfare-based inequality measures
Once one is persuaded of the idea that the social wrong of inequality can be
expressed in terms of a loss of social welfare and that inequality measures
inherit their properties from SWFs or vice versa there emerges a natural way
of characterising inequality in welfare terms. It might at first be thought that
there is an obstacle to using the SWF to specify an inequality index since
there are no “natural” units for the measurement of welfare. But we could
measure welfare – and therefore gains or losses of welfare – in terms of income.
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To do this, introduce the concept of the equally-distributed equivalent (EDE)
income. For any distribution x this can be represented as a number ξ such
that
W (x) = W (ξ1) = W (ξ, ξ, ..., ξ) . (24)
The EDE-income is a remarkably robust concept since little more than that
W be a continuous function is needed in order to be sure that any distribution
x has its corresponding EDE-income ξ. We could, if we wish, invert the
relationship (24) to make the dependence of ξ on the income distribution
explicit
ξ (x) = ξ (x1, x2, · · · , xn) . (25)
It is important to recognise that (21) and (25) do the same job: in using
ξ rather than W we have just chosen a cardinalisation of the social-welfare
function that is convenient to work with.
If the SWF has been specified so that unequal distributions register a loss
of social welfare then we may deduce that:
ξ (x) ≤ µ (x) (26)
where µ is the mean, defined in (1).15 A simple twist on (26) gives us the
following generic welfare-based index of inequality
15The reasoning is this. In principle you could take the total income in a distribution nµ
and allocate it equally among the n persons to give you the distribution µ1 = (µ, µ, ..., µ);
the EDE-income for this very special case is of course ξ= µ. Any perturbation that
produces a different distribution with the same mean must introduce some inequality
which reduces social welfare. Therefore (26) must be true.
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I (x) = 1− ξ (x)
µ (x) , (27)
which is unit-free, non-negative and assumes the value 0 when x = µ1.
Once again, similarly to (23) it is clear that, by taking the EDE-income
cardinalisation of welfare, we can write
welfare = ξ (x) = µ (x) [1− I (x)]
– compare this with equation (23).
The idea is illustrated in Figure 12 which shows the contours of W in the
space of Irene and Janet’s incomes. Point x represents the current income
distribution and the line through x and µ1 gives all the distributions with the
same mean µ. The dotted 45-degree ray represents equal distributions and it
is clear that the contours are symmetric about this ray (swapping Irene’s and
Janet’s identities leaves social welfare unchanged). The contour through the
point x intersects the equality ray at point ξ1 where ξ is the EDE income.
The gap between ξ (x) and µ (x) is the loss of welfare associated with the
inequality implicit in x and can be used to calculate the inequality index
(27). Obviously to go further we would need to know more about the shape
of W .
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Figure 12: Social welfare and inequality
So, to make these ideas clearer, let us take a specific type of SWF: it is
useful to consider all the functions W that can be written in the additively
separable form:
W (x) =
n∑
i=1
ζ (xi) , (28)
where ζ is a social-evaluation function that is the same for all individuals; in
this specification we evaluate social welfare by going through the population,
evaluating each person’s income xi and then summing the individual evalu-
ations. In particular we may need two further restrictions on the family of
SWFs in (28):
1. functions W where ζ (x) is increasing in x: see Figure 13 (a) and (b);
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2. functions W where ζ (x) is increasing in x and also the slope of ζ is
decreasing in x: see Figure 13 (b).
This specification is appealing and intuitive; but it is also quite restrictive
because it effectively allows only one type of relationship between mean in-
come and welfare: (the monotonicity property described above, implied by
restriction 1) and it collapses the two types of tradeoff mentioned at the end
of section 4.1 into a single tradeoff (implicit in the curvature of ζ in Figure
13 b).
Figure 13: Evaluation functions ζ
In this set-up social attitudes towards income distribution and inequality
are embodied in the social-evaluation function ζ. If this function is differen-
tiable let us write the slope of ζ at any point x as ζ ′ (x): given restriction 1,
ζ ′ (x) is positive for any x; and, given restriction 2, the slope of the function
ζ ′ must be negative (ζ ′′ (x) < 0). The importance of this can be seen if
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we use equation (28) to express the change in social welfare dW that would
arise if, for example, some policy or event changed individual incomes by the
amounts (dx1, dx2, · · · , dxn). Clearly we have
dW (x) =
n∑
i=1
ζ ′ (xi) dxi, (29)
which could be thought of as being the weighted sum of the income changes,
where the weight on the change in Irene’s income equals the marginal social
evaluation of Irene’s income. The weight is positive and decreases with in-
come; how sharply the weights decrease depends on how sharply curved is
the function ζ.
Figure 14: Isoelastic ζ for different values of ε
We can characterise the curvature of ζ by using ε (x), the elasticity of
marginal social evaluation at x, namely the percentage by which the weight
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falls given a one percent increase in income:
ε (x) := −xζ
′′ (x)
ζ ′ (x) . (30)
To fix ideas consider the family of isoelastic functions ζ, functions for which
ε is a given constant; some of these are illustrated in Figure 14. The general
formula is16
ζ (x) = x
1−ε − 1
1− ε , ε ≥ 0, (31)
so that the formula for the weights in this case is just
ζ ′ (x) = x−ε. (32)
Let us compute the effect on social welfare of a change in the incomes of
Irene and Janet; from (29) and (32) we have:
dW = x−εi dxi + x−εj dxj. (33)
Let us suppose that Irene has t times the income of Janet, with t > 1. In
this case we can easily find the tradeoff between Irene and Janet that would
keep social-welfare constant. By putting xi = txj and dW = 0 in (33) we get
−dxidxj = t
ε, (34)
16Using L’Hï¿œpital’s rule we find that in the case where ε = 1 equation (31) becomes
ζ (x) = log x.
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What this tells us is the tradeoff between equality and efficiency implicit in
W . If one were to raise poor Janet’s income by $1 then a sacrifice of up
to $tε by rich Irene would maintain or improve the current level of social
welfare. For example, suppose t = 5: then if ε = 12 a sacrifice of up to $2.24
by Irene would be warranted to increase Irene’s income by $1; but if ε = 1
the allowable sacrifice by Irene would rise to $5 ... and so on. Clearly this
amount increases with the value of the elasticity ε and for this reason ε is
usually known as the inequality aversion parameter.
An alternative way of interpreting ε is in terms of simple transfers in
different parts of the income distribution. Suppose that Irene’s income is t
times that of Janet’s and that Janet’s income is t times that of Karen (t > 1).
Then, using (33) we can calculate the (welfare-increasing) effect of a straight
Irene-Janet transfer and that of a Janet-Karen transfer of the same amount:
dWij =
[
−t−ε + 1
]
x−εj dx > 0, (35)
dWjk = [−1 + tε]x−εj dx > 0, (36)
Dividing the one by the other we have
dWjk
dWij
=
[−1 + tε]x−εj
[−t−ε + 1]x−εj
= tε. (37)
Since t > 1 by assumption, this is obviously greater than one if ε > 0, so that
dWjk > dWij (the transfer is more effective lower down the income scale).
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But we can see more: the relative size of the lower-income transfer effect
gets larger, the higher is ε. This second interpretation of ε in equation (37)
is logically separate from the equality-efficiency interpretation in (34): but,
in the special case where social welfare is additive (28), the two concepts
happen to have the same value.
If we use the additive, isoelastic form of the SWF defined by (28) and
(31) then the EDE income in (24) takes the form of a generalised mean:
ξ (x) =
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
x1−i
] 1
1−ε
(38)
and the associated inequality measure (27) takes the form of the Atkinson
class of indices (Atkinson 1970):17
IAtk (x) = 1−
 1
n
n∑
i=1
[
xi
µ (x)
]1−ε 11−ε . (39)
For a given unequal distribution x the higher is ε the lower is ξ (x) and the
higher is IAtk (x). Comparing IGE (x) with IAtk (x) – equations (3) and (39)
respectively – several points are immediately striking:
• In both cases we have a class of indices rather than a single inequality
measure; individual members of the class are characterised by a sensi-
tivity parameter (α in the case of IGE and ε in the case of IAtk); the
user of the inequality measure brings some personal or social judgment
17In the case where ε = 1 equation (39) becomes 1− exp
(
1
n
∑n
i=1 log
(
xi
µ(x)
))
.
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to the measurement problem by the choice of the parameter.
• The ordering of income distributions produced by a member of the
Atkinson class with parameter ε is the same as the corresponding GE
index with parameter α = 1 − ε: they produce the same inequality
contours in the distribution simplex of Figure 2.18
• In both cases the inequality contours are induced by a structural as-
sumption – scale invariance (Axiom 5) in the case of the GE indices,
isoelasticity of the social-evaluation function in the case of the Atkinson
indices.
4.3 Welfare and individual values
Clearly we can use the welfare-function approach to determine the shape of
the inequality contours in section 3.1. But a more important issue is, how
the characteristics of the welfare function are to be determined. There are
several routes through which we might imagine this to happen, which can be
grouped into two broad categories:
• Representation of innate desire for redistribution. Individual members
of society might have a preference for equality that is expressed through
the political process, through charitable giving or through survey re-
sponses.19 Society’s aversion to inequality is based on an externality
18There is no Atkinson index corresponding to a member of the GE family with α ≥ 1.
19On direct approach using questionnaires with student subjects see Amiel, Creedy, and
47
involving other people’s incomes (Hochman and Rodgers 1969; Kolm
1964, 1969; Thurow 1971).
• Imputation of a social ranking of income distributions from individual
rankings of probability distributions. One might take the position that
in some sense social values are a representation of individual preferences
or views behind a “veil of ignorance.” Here no-one need be averse
to inequality per se. However, everyone may be averse to risk and
in particular everyone may be averse to the risk associated with the
lottery of life (Harsanyi, 1953, 1955 1978; Rawls, 1971, 1999). Because
individuals experience a loss of utility through risk and are willing to
sacrifice income in order to insure against it, inequality – the social
counterpart of risk – leads to social welfare loss.
In practice aversion to inequality may come from both of these routes and
people may not view risk and inequality in exactly the same way (Cowell and
Schokkaert 2001, Kroll and Davidovitz 2003, Carlsson et al. 2005).
From the discussion of equation (34) above it is clear that the degree of
inequality aversion can be seen in terms of the calibration of a tradeoff –
either (a) between greater equality and higher overall income or (b) between
transfers in different parts of the distribution. For the Atkinson indices (39)
the precise tradeoff can be characterised by the value of ε, the elasticity of
Hurn (1999), Gevers et al. (1979), Glejser et al. (1977); see also Gaertner and Schokkaert
(2012), Van Praag (1977, 1978), Herwaarden et al. (1977), Van Batenburg and Van Praag
(1980).
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marginal social evaluation. Clearly then, an important further question for
policy-makers is how to determine reasonable values for ε. If we want to
base this on the views of everyday people we could appeal to experimental
or questionnaire evidence. However, caution is necessary in interpreting such
evidence: preferences reversals can arise in the context of social choice similar
to those that arise in the context of individual choice (Amiel et al. 2008)
and estimates of ε from from leaky-bucket exercises may be affected by the
way the issue is put (Pirttilä and Uusitalo 2010). Evidence from happiness
studies suggest a value of 1.0 to 1.5 for ε (Layard et al. 2008); inferring ε
from tax schedules we find a value of around 1.2 to 1.4 (Cowell and Gardiner
2000).
5 Poverty measurement: principles
The fundamental difference between the inequality-measurement problem
and the poverty-measurement problem is, of course, the poverty line. The
poverty line performs several roles in the poverty-measurement problem: it
partitions the population into two groups that we want to treat differently in
analysing income distribution; it forms a reference point; it can be a policy
parameter in its own right. But, of course, reading through this list of roles
we can spot several points where there appear to be important links with
inequality analysis: the decomposition into poor and non-poor subgroups
and the concept of a reference income, for example. So we may expect –
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and indeed we will find – some carry-over of the measurement analysis from
Section 3.
A lot could be written on the income concept that is appropriate for the
analysis of poverty and the determination of the poverty line, but such ar-
guments are usually about the implementation of the principles of poverty
measurement rather than the principles themselves. Once again we will sup-
pose that an income concept has been specified (this “income” could, for
example, be defined as consumption expenditure or as assets) and so an in-
come distribution is just a vector of real numbers, as we discussed in section
2.1. The poverty line could be determined with reference to the living stan-
dards in the society represented by the income distribution; it could be fixed
by international standards or by the observer’s own personal introspection; it
could be determined from the distribution itself (for example many empirical
studies use half the median income as a poverty line). For our purposes it is
convenient for the moment to suppose that the poverty line is an exogenously
given number z: any person i for whom xi ≤ z is deemed to be poor.20
What do we mean by a poverty measure? The language is important here
because the intuitive approaches discussed in section 5.1 focus on simple mea-
20There is a point of detail to note here: the majority of the formal literature use this
so-called “strong” version of poverty where xi ≤ z means “i is poor” rather than its “weak”
counterpart where the criterion is xi < z (an interesting exception is Watts 1968), but in
practice governmental agencies and others often adopt the weak version. Clearly this is
important for poverty measures that rely on a head count of the poor (are people with
incomes exactly equal to z poor or not?) such as (40) below, but not for the other poverty
measures and results discussed below (Zheng 1997, Donaldson and Weymark 1986).
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sures with cardinal significance,21 but for formal approaches the discussion is
sometimes of specific indices, sometimes of orderings: in section 5.2 we will
focus on poverty orderings, as in section 3 on inequality. We will consider
more general poverty rankings separately, in section 6.
5.1 Intuitive approaches
There are several poverty indices that spring to mind naturally from no more
than a brief scan of the data and the simplest calculations. These are indices
that are used by policy makers and that provide numbers with a compelling,
common-sense interpretation. They also serve as reference points for the
more sophisticated analysis in section 5.2. The leading indices are as follows.
• Headcount ratio. For any z we just work out nz, the number in the
population with incomes less than or equal to z, and divide this by the
population:
nz
n
where nz :=
∑
xi≤z
1. (40)
• Average income gap ratio (1). For each person i define the individual
income gap is the income shortfall (if any) below the poverty line:
gi = max {z − xi, 0} . (41)
21See Section 2.3 for a discussion of the terminology.
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Then the average income gap ratio (relative to the poverty line) is
1
nz
n∑
i=1
gi
z
. (42)
• Average income gap ratio (2). An alternative normalisation for the
average income gap is
1
n
n∑
i=1
gi
µ (x) . (43)
Notice that the average in (42) is taken over the number who are poor,
whereas the average in (43) is over the whole population.
Which of the poverty measures (40), (42) and (43) is “right”? In a sense,
all of them are. We can regard the headcount ratio and the average income-
gap ratio as picking up two different, complementary aspects of poverty: the
head-count ratio focuses on the labelling effect of poverty, the proportion
of the population that carries the disfiguring mark of being poor; the aver-
age gap concept gives us some idea of the resources necessary to eliminate
poverty. Version 1 (equation 42) expresses the resource-requirement inter-
pretation relative to the poverty line; version 2 (equation 43) expresses the
same idea as a proportion of resources available in the economy. It is clear
that any two of these intuitive measures could contradict each other in terms
of answering the question whether poverty has increased or decreased, even
with a fixed poverty line.22 But this does not necessarily matter: the differ-
22Example. Suppose the poverty line is fixed at 100. Then, if the income distribution
changes from (10,50,90,1000) to (50,50,110,500), the headcount ratio falls from 0.75 to 0.5,
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ent measures just reveal different things about the concept of poverty and
our understanding is enriched by having these different perspectives.
5.2 Axiomatic approach
Why should we want to go beyond these simple, intuitive approaches? A good
answer to this question is that it may be appropriate to consider whether
poverty measurement should take into account more information about the
income distribution. The simple summary statistics in (40)-(43) remain un-
changed if there is some redistribution among the poor that leaves unchanged
the numbers and average income of the poor. However, this would imply that
we consider the following two distributions to represent the same level of ag-
gregate poverty: (a) a distribution where all poor people have exactly the
same income and (b) a distribution in which poor people are polarised into
two groups, those close to destitution and those just below the poverty line.
If the distribution amongst the poor is of concern then we may need a more
sophisticated poverty measure (Watts 1968, Sen 1976).
Why could an axiomatic approach be useful? A good answer to this
question is that, as with inequality measurement, there may be specific as-
pects of the comparison of income distributions in terms of poverty that are
best considered as abstract principles; expressing these principles in terms of
formal axioms may help to narrow down the class of poverty measures that
the average income gap (1) stays the same (at 0.5) and the average income gap (2) rises
from 0.13 to 0.14.
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may be worth considering in addition to – or even instead of – the intuitive
approaches outlined in section 5.1. However, in the case of poverty, it may
be that some of the additional formality that has been introduced has tended
to obscure rather than illuminate the central issues. Some of the axioms23
that have been suggested are less persuasive than their counterparts in in-
equality analysis and some may actually obscure the insights available from
the simpler approaches in section 5.1. Perhaps poverty is in danger of being
over-axiomed.
Methodologically the approach is similar to what we did in the case of
inequality: the principal difference is that rather than just comparing distri-
butions n-vectors we are now working with n+ 1 incomes (x1, x2, · · · , xn, z)
– or, written more compactly, (x, z). Some of the axioms from section 3 can
be carried over with just minor notational modification: where this works
we will just note how the axiom needs to be adapted (this is usually little
more than cosmetic) rather than writing everything out explicitly in the new
notation.
Basic form
The first key result needs the anonymity property (Axioms 1), adapted by
replacing I with P and three new axioms:
23Among the suggested axioms for poverty measurement are Transfer axiom (a reworking
of axiom 3 for the population of the poor), upward transfers (a combination of the transfer
axiom and focus), population growth amongst the poor, population growth amongst the
non-poor. Unsurprisingly perhaps, it is easy to find fundamental conflict among some of
the proposed axioms (Kundu and Smith 1983). See also Donaldson and Weymark (1986).
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Axiom 7 (Focus). Suppose x′ is formed from x thus: x′i = xi + δ where
xi > z (and x′j = xj for all j 6= i); then P (x′, z) = P (x, z).
Axiom 8 (Monotonicity). Suppose x′ is formed from x thus: xi < x′i ≤ z
and x′j = xj for all j 6= i; then P (x′, z) < P (x, z).
Axiom 9 (Independence). Consider x,y ∈ Xn such that P (x, z) = P (y, z)
and, for some person i, xi = yi < z. Suppose x′,y′ satisfy x′i = y′i ≤ z and
x′j = xj, y′j = yj for all j 6= i; then P (x′, z) = P (y′, z).
We can interpret Axiom 7 as requiring that the incomes of people who are
not poor are irrelevant to poverty comparisons. This might be considered
the essential axiom of poverty measurement, although in fact the second
version of the Average income gap ratio violates it. Axiom 8 means that
if the income of any poor person is increased then poverty must decrease24
(but note that the headcount ratio violates this property). Axiom 9 says the
following: take two distributions that are exactly equal in terms of aggregate
poverty; suppose there is a particular income xi that is common to both
distributions; then varying that common value will change the measured
poverty in the two distributions by the same amount, whatever the other
incomes in each distribution may be. This property is exhibited by each of
the intuitive measures in section 5.1.
24There is an important difference in the precise definition of monotonicity as defined
here in Axiom 8 and the monotonicity property discussed in connection with the SWF in
section 4.1: the monotonicity principle for the function W in (21) means that increase in
anybody’s income (rich or poor) increases welfare; but the monotonicity axiom here applies
only to incomes below the poverty line.
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Theorem 3 The poverty version of Axiom 1 and Axioms 7-9 jointly imply
that a continuous poverty ordering must be representable by the measure
P (x, z) = 1
n
∑
xi≤z
p (xi, z) (44)
where p is a continuous function that is decreasing in xi as long as xi < z.
So, invoking just a few appealing principles results in a particularly useful
class of poverty measures, the Additively Separable Poverty (ASP) class: the
crucial assumption for this is Axiom 9, which rules out concepts of poverty
that explicitly take into account the person’s position in the distribution.
At the centre of (44) is the individual poverty-evaluation function p which
gives a natural interpretation to the ASP measures. One goes through the
population and evaluates each person’s income xi in the light of the poverty
line: if person i is above the poverty line then the evaluation is zero; if i is
exactly on the poverty line then the evaluation is zero; for all other cases the
evaluation is higher the lower is i’s income.
Of course the form (44) allows a lot of leeway in the precise precise spec-
ification of the poverty-evaluation function. Just as we did for inequality
measures in section 3.1 it is useful to see what additional principles might
be usefully imposed on the structure of income distributions to narrow down
the class of admissible poverty measures.
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Income structure
In the analysis of inequality measurement we considered scale invariance and
translation invariance (Axioms 5 and 6) as two different principles inducing
what might appear to be a sensible structure on the map of iso-inequality
contours (in the case of just two sets of contours both principles could be
applied at the same time – see Figure 5). In the analysis of poverty mea-
surement, we can again appeal to these principles but with two important
differences: (1) we require them to apply to all n+ 1 incomes (x, z) ∈ Xn+1
and (2) they not only induce a set of iso-poverty contours but also imply
that the resulting poverty indices incorporate a specific relationship between
individual incomes and the poverty line. The key result is (Ebert and Moyes
2002):
Theorem 4 If the ASP poverty indices also satisfy the poverty version of
Axioms 5 and 6 then the individual poverty-evaluation function p must take
either the form gθi or the form [gi/z]
θ, where gi is defined in (41) and θ is a
positive parameter.
An important implication of Theorem 4 is that the scale-invariance and
translation-invariance properties alone are enough to restrict the ASP class
to some of the most widely employed poverty measures, the so-called Foster-
Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) indices:
P θFGT (x, z) :=
1
n
∑
xi≤z
[
gi
z
]θ
, (45)
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(see Foster et al. 1984).25 Once again, as with the GE, Temkin and Atkinson
measures in the inequality context, one has a family of measures, indexed
by a sensitivity parameter θ. A glance back at section 3.3 also shows the
strong similarity between FGT poverty measures and Temkin-type inequal-
ity indices, which should not come as a big surprise since they both use a
reference point and they are both built on similar axioms regarding scale-
and translation-invariance.
Theorem 4 implies that θ is a positive number, but it is useful to consider
the extension of the class (45) to the case θ = 0.26 The two cases θ = 0,1
have a natural interpretation; these two cases and θ = 2 are illustrated in
Figure 15:
• θ = 0. Letting θ go to zero in (45) we can see that P 0FGT (x, z) is simply
the headcount ratio (40). The individual poverty-evaluation function
in this case is illustrated in the top-left panel of Figure 15: p (x, z)
jumps from 1 to 0 as x goes from less than z to more than z.
• θ = 1. In this special case we find
P 1FGT (x, z) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
gi
z
, (46)
25These correspond to the case p (xi, z) = [gi/z]θ; theorem 4 also allows for an “absolute”
version of this class where p (xi, z) = gθi .
26Foster et al. (1984) originally specified (45) with θ ≥ 0; but in the special case θ = 0
the FGT index is discontinuous (there is a jump as xi approaches z and the Ebert and
Moyes (2002) result requires the index to be continuous.
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Figure 15: Poverty evaluation, FGT indices
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the product of two intuitive poverty indices, the headcount ratio (40)
and the average income gap ratio (42). In fact P 1FGT (x, z) can be taken
as yet another convenient way of normalising the average income gap.
The individual poverty-evaluation function is illustrated in the top-
right panel of Figure 15: the individual poverty gap g is measured in the
opposite direction to x (and is zero for x > z); p (x, z) is proportional
to g.
• θ = 2. This is an example of where the poverty measure is sensitive to
inequality amongst the poor – it satisfies the transfer principle (Axiom
3). To see this check the individual poverty evaluations on the vertical
axis for fairly poor Irene p (xi, z) and very poor Janet p (xj, z); now
suppose Irene’s and Janet’s incomes are equalised and check the poverty
evaluation of their averaged incomes on the vertical axis; clearly
p
(1
2 [xi + xj] , z
)
<
1
2 [p (xi, z) + p (xj, z)]
and so partial equalisation amongst the poor reduces measured poverty.
Poverty contours
The contours of any member of the class (45) can of course be represented
in the income simplex, just as we did with inequality contours. Figure 16
shows an example with θ = 1: the central triangle is determined by the
given poverty line z. Within that triangle everyone is out of poverty; outside
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Figure 16: Poverty contours, θ = 1
the triangle some are in poverty and the figure depicts the contours of the
average income gap (the inverted triangle shapes). At the specific income
distribution x∗ Irene and Janet are out of poverty, but Karen is below the
poverty line.
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5.3 Other approaches
Axiom 9 rules out the possibility that individual poverty evaluations depend
on the individual’s position in the distribution. So, clearly, if we drop the
restriction imposed by this axiom other possibilities for poverty measurement
are opened up. This was part of the insight of the Sen (1976) contribution
which explicitly designed the transfer principle into the construction of the
poverty measure. Let xP be the income distribution among the poor so that
IGini (xP) represents inequality among the poor. Then the Sen index can be
represented as
PSen (x, z) = P 0FGT (x, z) IGini (xP) + P 1FGT (x, z) [1− IGini (xP)] . (47)
The contour map can be found by replacing the inverted triangles in Figure
16 by hexagonal shapes (Cf Figures 5 (b) and 7 in the case of inequality).
Of course one could go further and replace the contours in Figure 16 with
contours derived from some alternative principles: for example we might
wish to invoke social-welfare principles similar to those invoked in section 4.1
for inequality (Blackorby and Donaldson 1980a, Chakravarty 1983) but it is
not clear how much additional insight is to be obtained over the basic FGT
structure (45).
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6 Inequality and poverty: ranking
Section 2.3 briefly introduced the idea of ranking (in contrast to ordering)
as a measurement concept. Let us now see why a tool that may yield an
ambiguous answer can still be useful as a method of comparing income dis-
tributions. The key idea is that of distributional dominance which can take a
variety of forms, discussed in section 6.2;27 first let us consider the common
thread of analysis.
6.1 A meta-analysis
There are several ranking approaches that are of potential interest in studying
inequality and poverty. For this reason it is useful to consider a meta analysis
that will enable us to see how any particular ranking argument may be used.
Suppose that for each person i in the distribution we define some concept
of individual status qi which may depend on i’s own income, on the rest of the
distribution and possibly on other information. Then consider the problem
of comparing two distributions with associated status vectors (q1, q2, ..., qn)
and (q′1, q′2, ..., q′n) for a population of size n. A natural way of doing this is to
introduce the idea of dominance: given the definition of status we say that
(q1, q2, ..., qn) dominates (q′1, q′2, ..., q′n) if it is true that
27These are “type-2” measures, in the terminology of section 2.3.
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q(1) ≥ q′(1),
q(2) ≥ q′(2),
...
q(n) ≥ q′(n)
and for at least one person q(i) > q′(i), where the subscript (1) denotes the per-
son with the lowest income, (2) denotes the person with the second smallest
income, and so on. Notice that the each status vector is separately arranged
according to income to carry out this comparison: so if one income vec-
tor were formed just by rearranging the components of the other, the two
resulting status vectors would be regarded as equivalent.
A typical way of checking for dominance is to draw a graph of q(k) against
k
n
for two distributions in a population of size n. Clearly this defines a set of
n points rather than a curve; so the convention is to define an extra starting
point
(
0, q
)
(where q is the smallest possible value of status, often assumed
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to be zero)28 and to plot the n+ 1 points (A0, A1, A2, ..., An) given by
A0 =
(
0, q
)
,
A1 =
(
1
n
, q(1)
)
,
A2 =
(
2
n
, q(2)
)
,
... ...
An−1 =
(
n−1
n
, q(n−1)
)
,
An =
(
1, q(n)
)

(48)
connected by straight lines. Comparing the curves for (q1, ..., qn) and (q′1, ..., q′n)
immediately reveals whether or not there is dominance.
If the distributions being compared really do have the same population
then the above graphing convention is just a convention; but if the status vec-
tors being compared are from different-sized populations then the connected
curves are often important in checking whether or not there is dominance.29
Thus far the dominance definition and its associated graph is devoid of
interpretation. But this immediately acquires importance once we plug into
(48) different versions of status with associated meanings in terms of inequal-
ity, social welfare and poverty. Then (48) acts as a graph template for differ-
28For second-order dominance (see section 6.2) q = 0, but for first-order dominance q
can be taken as the lower bound to the support of the income distribution.
29Example. If the first distribution has n = 2, then it is represented by three points
A0 =
(
0, q
)
, A1 =
( 1
2 , q(1)
)
, A2 =
(
1, q(2)
)
; if the second distribution has n = 4, then it is
represented by five points A′0 =
(
0, q′
)
, A′1 =
(
1
4 , q
′
(1)
)
, A′2 =
(
1
2 , q
′
(2)
)
, A′3 =
(
3
4 , q
′
(3)
)
,
A′4 =
(
1, q′(4)
)
. To check for dominance you need to check whether A′1 lies above or below
a point half-way between A0 and A1 and whether A′3 lies above or below a point half-way
between A1 and A2 .
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ent dominance concepts associated with important results in the literature.
In section 6.2 we examine the principal dominance concepts that are useful
in the inequality-measurement and poverty-measurement problems and then
in section 6.3 we examine the results associated with these concepts.
6.2 First and second order dominance
Dominance criteria are widely known from the literature on risk taking where
they are usually usually known as stochastic dominance criteria. In the anal-
ysis of income distributions no uncertainty is involved (so the “stochastic”
is superfluous) and the results are extended to include applications in the
context of inequality and poverty.
First-order dominance.
Perhaps the simplest application is to associate each person’s status with
his/her income so that, for i = 1, 2, ..., n:
q(i) = x(i),
q′(i) = x′(i).
Here the q values are simply the quantiles of the distribution – so if i/n = 0.25
then q(i) is the lower quartile, if i/n = 0.50 then q(i) is the median and so on.
Plugging this into (48) gives Pen’s (1974) Parade diagram which, because we
have sorted the x-values into ascending order, must be an upward sloping
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graph.
We can use the Parade to give us a simple and fairly intuitive result on
welfare: if x quantile-dominates x′ then we must have W (x) > W (x′) for
any monotonic social-welfare function W (Saposnik 1981, 1983); we can also
obtain from the quantiles a number of intuitive indices that have been used
to characterise the spread of distributions, such as the interquartile range,
the 90-10 ratio and so on. However, these first-order concepts do not conform
to the key axioms outlined in section 3.1; the principal contributions to the
theory of inequality measurement come from the concept of second-order
dominance.
Second-order dominance.
Let us first introduce the idea of a normalised income cumulation, where one
sums the first k incomes in ascending order, x(1) + x(2) + ...+ x(k), and then
divides by the population size:
ck :=
1
n
k∑
i=1
x(i), k = 1, 2, ..., n. (49)
In this case we associate status with income cumulation. By setting A0 =
(0, 0) and q(k) = ck in the template graph (48) we obtain the so-called Gener-
alised Lorenz curves (GLC). Because the x-values are arranged in ascending
order (so that one is adding into the sum in (49) ever larger incomes as k
increases) the GLC must be a convex curve. Also, by definition, cn = µ (x).
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0(a)
sk
k/n 0
(b)
sk
k/n
0
sk
(c)
k/n
• (a) non-negative incomes
• (b) some negative incomes, 
but positive mean 
• (c) many negative incomes 
and negative mean
Figure 17: Lorenz curves for different types of distribution
Second-order dominance has a great significance for a number of results
on social welfare, inequality comparisons and poverty comparisons which are
discussed in section 6.3. Some of these results follow from simple extensions
of the basic second-order dominance concept which we will review first.
Extensions of second-order dominance.
Associated with the GLC are a number of related concepts that are widely
used in the income-distribution literature.
68
• (Relative) Lorenz Curves. If we divide the income cumulations by the
population mean µ (x) we get the income shares
sk :=
ck
µ (x) =
1
nµ (x)
k∑
i=1
x(i), k = 1, 2, ..., n. (50)
More precisely sk is the share in total income of the bottom 100k/n
percent of the population. Plugging the shares (50) into the graph
template (48) yields a persuasive pictorial representation of income
distribution, the Lorenz curve (the “Relative” tag is sometimes added
to distinguish it from Generalised and Absolute Lorenz curves). The
Lorenz or shares ranking provides an intuitive method of inequality
comparison.: if all incomes are non-negative the Lorenz curve will look
like Figure 17 (a), an increasing, convex curve from (0,0) to (1,1); if
the curve for distribution x′ lies everywhere above that for x then it is
clear that the income-share of the bottom 10 percent, the bottom 20
percent... of the population is higher in x′ than in x, so that x′ appears
unambiguously more equal than x; the limiting case of perfect equality
is represented by the diagonal line. There is a potential problem if x can
take negative values, a situation that is particularly important when
dealing with the inequality of wealth: if there are just a few negative
values so that we still have µ (x) > 0 then the Lorenz curve looks like
Figure 17 (b); if there are so many negative incomes that µ (x) < 0
then the Lorenz curve bends “the wrong way” as in Figure 17 (c); and
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if µ (x) = 0 the Lorenz curve is undefined (Amiel et al. 1996).
• Absolute Lorenz curves. In this case the counterpart to (50) is the
absolute Lorenz curve (ALC). For this we let
q(k) = ck − k
n
µ (x) (51)
in the graph template. It is clear that, in contrast to the relative Lorenz
curve, the resulting convex curve starts from (0,0), dips below the hori-
zontal axis and ends at (1,0). The ALC is a particularly convenient tool
for comparing distributions where a large proportion of the incomes are
negative.
• Cumulative Complaint Contours. In the context of the reference-point
approach to inequality measurement, the Cumulative Complaint Con-
tour (CCC) can be used to provide a visual representation of distance-
based “Temkin” inequality. Using the definition of complaint or dis-
tance in (19) calculate the cumulative complaints:
Dk :=
1
n
k∑
i=1
di, k = 1, 2, ..., n. (52)
Putting q(k) = Dk in the template (48) we obtain the CCC. It is clear
that this is an increasing concave curve because the ordering by income
ensures that the largest distances are included first in the sum (52).
• TIP curves. The discussion in section 5 focused on three aspects of
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poverty that can be summarised as the Three “I”s of Poverty (Jenkins
and Lambert 1997): Incidence (as indicated by the headcount ratio), In-
tensity (as indicated by the average income gap) and Inequality among
the poor. These three features are evident if we construct cumulative
poverty gaps in the same way as we constructed income cumulations
in (49), namely
Gk :=
1
n
k∑
i=1
gi, k = 1, 2, ..., n. (53)
where gi = max
{
z − x(i), 0
}
. Setting q(k) = Gk in the template (48) we
obtain the TIP curve. This is a concave curve (for the same reason as
given for the CCC) and is increasing up to k∗, the first value of k such
that gk = 0, and constant thereafter; k∗/n is the headcount ratio (the
Incidence component of the TIP); Gk∗ is the (non-normalised) average
income gap (the Intensity component) and the curvature of the TIP
represents the Inequality of the income gaps.
We now turn to the results that can be obtained from each of these graphs.
6.3 Significance for welfare, inequality and poverty
Welfare and distributional rankings.
To show how the second-order dominance criteria can be interpreted in terms
of social welfare we need to do a small adaptation to the statement of Axiom
3 in order to obtain a welfare version of this principle – just substitute the
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expression “W (x) > W (x′)” for “I (x) < I (x′)” in the statement of Axiom
3.
The first key result, originally formulated by Atkinson (1970), links (rel-
ative) Lorenz curves and SWFs that satisfy the key principle of inequality
measurement:30
Theorem 5 For any x,x′ ∈ Xn(µ) , x Lorenz-dominates x′ if and only if
W (x) > W (x′) for all welfare functions satisfying the transfer principle.
So the Lorenz curve is intimately connected with welfare judgments that
respect the transfer principle. However, it may be regarded as a weakness
that this result restricts attention solely to distributions for which µ (x) =
µ (x′): it remains silent on cases where the distributions compared differ in
terms of total income.
Our second key result deals with the income-change issue. Recall that
we distinguished a number of possibly interesting cases, depicted in Figure
11. Panel (a) of that figure illustrates the case of monotonicity whereby
W (x + dx) > W (x) for any dx > 0. Panel (b) illustrates both the principle
of scale growth, whereby W (λx) > W (x) for any λ > 1, and the principle
of uniform income growth, whereby W (x+δ1) > W (x) for any δ > 0. Then
we may state (Shorrocks 1983):
30Atkinson (1970) established Theorem 5 for a more restrictive class of welfare function,
whereW can be expressed in the additive form (28). However it can easily be broadened to
the version stated here – see Arnold (1987), Dasgupta et al. (1973), Fields and Fei (1978),
Kolm (1966, 1968, 1969), Kurabayashi and Yatsuka (1977), Rothschild and Stiglitz (1973).
These approaches are based on the classic work of Hardy et al. (1934).
72
Theorem 6 For any x,x′ ∈ Xn:
(a) x generalised Lorenz-dominates x′ if and only if W (x) > W (x′) for
all SWFs satisfying monotonicity and the transfer principle.
(b) x relative Lorenz-dominates x′ if and only if W (x) > W (x′) and
µ(x) ≥ µ(x′), for all SWFs satisfying the principle of scale growth and the
transfer principle.
(c) x absolute Lorenz-dominates x′ if and only if W (x) > W (x′) for
all SWFs satisfying the principle of uniform income growth and the transfer
principle.
Inequality and Poverty.
The essential inequality result follows immediately from Theorem 5. We
know that a welfare-based inequality measure can be constructed from any
SWF using (24) and (27) and the inequality contours and the welfare contours
in Xn(µ) will be exactly the same. Theorem 5 thus implies that x Lorenz-
dominates x′ if and only if I(x) < I(x′) for all inequality measures satisfying
the transfer principle. So, in terms of the hexagon diagrams in Figures 3
and 4, if x Lorenz-dominates x′ then x must lie inside the x′-hexagon; if the
Lorenz curves intersect then we have a situation similar to that in Figure 4.
The result obtainable for generalised Lorenz dominance (Theorem 6) can
be adapted to yield a nice result for the case of reference-point inequality. If x′
CCC-dominates x then ITemk (x′) > ITemk (x) for all Temkin-type inequality
measures based on the BoP reference point and that satisfy the transfer
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principle (Cowell and Ebert 2004). A similar result is available for poverty
using the TIP curve: if (x′, z) TIP-dominates (x, z) then P (x′, z′) > P (x, z′)
for all poverty measures P that satisfy the population principle (Axiom 2)
and the transfer principle for poverty measures and for all z′ ≤ z (Jenkins
and Lambert 1997).31
7 Conclusion
Inequality and poverty measures in common use can be seen to be founded on
a relatively small number of principles. In the main these principles accord
well with intuition and can be represented using a relatively small number
of mathematical functions. In many cases there is a natural interpretation
of inequality measures in terms of welfare economics.
31Note that the headcount ratio and the average income gap ratio do not fall into this
class of measures.
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